In this paper, we study the application of universal hashing to the construction of unconditionally secure authentication codes without secrecy. This idea is most useful when the number of authenticators is exponentially small compared to the number of possible source states (plaintext messages). We formally define some new classes of hash functions and then prove some new bounds and give some general constructions for these classes of hash functions. Then we discuss the implications to authentication codes.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the application of universal hashing to the construction of unconditionally secure authentication codes without secrecy. This idea is due to Wegman and Carter [14] , who gave a construction which is useful when the number of authenticators is exponentially small compared to the number of possible source states (plaintext messages). We generalize the Wegman and Carter construction by formally defining some new classes of hash functions. We prove some new bounds and give some general constructions for these classes of hash functions. Then we discuss the implications to authentication codes.
We are able to decrease the key length by a factor of four (roughly) compared to the Wegman and Carter construction, while maintaining the same security.
The paper is organized as follows. In this introduction we give an informal discussion of the motivation for this paper. Section 2 is a brief review of the necessary background of authentication codes. Section 3 gives relevant definitions from universal hashing. Section 4 presents proofs of new lower bounds on the number of hash functions in certain types of universal classes and gives the basic construction for authentication codes from universal classes of hash functions. Section 5 gives a variety of new constructions for universal classes of hash functions. In Section 6, we bring all the theory together and discuss its implications to the construction of authentication codes. Section 7 makes further comments and discusses open questions.
Here are a couple of hypothetical examples to motivate the problems we study. Suppose we have an authentication code with k possible source states and e possible authenticators. That is, we wish to authenticate a log k-bit message with a log e-bit authenticator. An opponent who plays either impersonation or substitution can deceive the transmitter with a probability of at least 1/e (in either case). * A preliminary version of this paper was presented at CRYPTO '91 and appeared in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 576, pp. 74-85, Springer-Verlag, 1992.
One important point is that k and s are independent parameters, k is the number of possible source states; s is a security parameter. For many applications, s = 220 might yield an acceptable security level. But it is certainly conceivable that we might want an authentication code providing this level of security where k is very small (e.g. k = 2, so we are authenticating only one bit of information) or where k is very large (e.g. k = 222~, so we are authenticating 220 bits of information).
Researchers have generally concentrated on the construction of codes which ensure that the opponent's deception probabilities are limited to the lower bound of 1/e. The main tool for constructing such codes has been a structure from combinatorial design theory called an orthogonal array (or equivalent structures, such as mutually orthogonal Latin squares, transversal designs or nets). Codes constructed by this method contain the minimum possible number of authentication rules, which is an important consideration since the authentication rule is secret information that must be exchanged over a secure channel before the transmission of a message.
In this paper, we shall use the language of orthogonal arrays. An O A (& k, L) is a Ls 2 x k array of s symbols, such that in any two columns of the array every one of the possible s pairs of symbols occurs in exactly X rows. It is shown in [9] that an OA(s k, L) gives rise to an authentication code for k source states, with s authenticators and Zs authentication rules (each row of the array gives rise in an obvious way to an authentication rule which assigns an authenticator to every possible source state, and the authentication rules are each used with equal probability). It has been known since 1945 (see [5] ) that if an OA(s k, )~) exists, then k(g-1)+ 1
~>_ s
Of course Zs > s the Plackett-Burman bound further implies that Ls 2 > k(s -1) + 1 if k>s Suppose we construct an authentication code by this orthogonal array method. Then for a fixed security level (e.g. e = 22~ the number of authentication rules increases linearly as a function of the number of possible source states. For large values of k, we require many bits of "secret key" to be exchanged--this is similar to the situation with the "one-time pad."
The observation of Wegman and Carter [14] is that by not requiring the deception probabilities to be the theoretical minimum (i.e. 1/s one can sometimes reduce the number of authentication rules in an authentication code significantly, at least in the case where k >> s
Authentication Codes
The general theory of unconditional authentication has been developed by Simmons (see e.g.
[7], [8]), and has been extensively studied in recent years. In this section, we will give a brief review of some relevant known results concerning authentication without secrecy. In the usual model for authentication, there are three participants: a transmitter, a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter wants to communicate some information to the receiver
